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I may say, to begin with, that psycho-analysis is not a child of speculation, but the result of experience, and for this reason, like every new product of science, is unfinished.²

The above words, although written by Freud, are not to be found in the *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychoanalytic Works of Sigmund Freud* or in the volumes of his published correspondence. Rather, they appear in a paper, *On Psychoanalysis*, which has had limited circulation and of which there is only an English-language version extant. *On Psychoanalysis* was written for the ninth session of the *Section of Neurology and Psychiatry Australasian Medical Congress* held in Sydney in 1911. Here, in this ninth edition of *Écritique*, we are republishing Freud's paper, on the 100th anniversary of the first publication of his work in Australia.

One of the earliest recorded encounters between psychoanalysis and psychiatry in Australia is traceable to a letter cited by Ernest Jones, which was sent to Freud in 1909 informing him that a Sydney-based group established by a Dr Donald Fraser was studying his work.³ In the absence of any Australian documentation of this group, little more is known about it. In 1911, the secretary of the Mental Health and Neurology Section, Dr Andrew Davidson, also wrote to Freud, extending an invitation to him to read papers at the Australasian Congress, along with Carl Gustav Jung and Havelock Ellis.⁴ As none was able to attend, each sent a paper that was presented by proxy on the day. Freud suggested to Jung that they write a joint paper. Jung refused, however, and forwarded his own independently.⁵

Freud's reference in this paper to psychoanalysis as an "unfinished product of science" is a curious one. Could we validly propose today, with Freud, that psychoanalysis remains *unfinished*, and, if so, would the reasons Freud espoused in 1911 concur with our own? Psychoanalysis is certainly no longer new, but perhaps it is the relationship between science and psychoanalysis that prevails as unfinished, coextensive with a form of writing specific to psychoanalysis that does not cease to nominate a limit, marking the difference between rigid science and rigorous science.

From the inception of psychoanalysis, and in the context of an often contentious and difficult, even forced proximity to medicine, psychoanalysis and psychiatry have rarely cohabitated as comfortable bedfellows. In 1966, Lacan claimed that psychoanalysis was responsible for this disturbance, having rearranged the furniture by shunting the subject of science from the bed (where it lay furtively dreaming) onto the couch. Thus, in *Science and Truth* Lacan asks:

Must it be stated that we have to know [*connaître*] other bodies of knowledge [*saviours*] than that of science when it comes to dealing with the epistemological drive? Returning again to what is at issue: Is this to admit that we must give up the notion in psychoanalysis that a body of knowledge corresponds to every truth? This is the breaking point whereby we depend upon the advent of science. We no longer have anything with which to join knowledge and truth together but the subject of science.⁶

If science can be understood as defined by its object, a certain modification of the object was established with the advent of psychoanalysis – a shift Lacan considered exemplary in Freud's axiom, *Wo Es war, soll Ich werden*.⁷ Furthermore, it was with this radical

rearrangement that the epistemological object was inserted into the division of the subject, disclosing the unholy divide between truth and knowledge. Thus, Freud's theory of a double inscription (the mnemonic traces of the unconscious) designated a form of writing, which, according to Lacan, "does not etch into the same side of the parchment when it comes from the printing-plate of truth and when it comes from that of knowledge".⁸

Perhaps at its worst, the encounter between science and psychoanalysis has inclined towards the delusion of a conjugal agreement – a situation possibly reaching its nemesis in the United States during the twenties, when, *contra* Freud's recommendation, the statutory bodies stepped in as celebrant, legislating against the practice of lay analysis. According to Ona Nierenberg, the effects of this co-option of psychoanalysis by psychiatry still reverberate today, and possible to an even greater extent since the ban on lay analysis was lifted under a raft of new conditions that contradict psychoanalysis.⁹ In *The Analyst Confronted with State Legitimacy*, Guy Le Gaufey notes that when the state is in a position of governance, either symbolic or imaginary in relation to psychoanalysis, this can lead to an elision of the body in psychoanalysis.¹⁰ Matchmaking between psychoanalysis and science, and psychoanalysis and the state, produces a scientism, which in adhering to the ideal, operates at the furthest distance from any possibility of a science of psychoanalysis. Referencing Freud, Lacan described scientism as a "successful paranoia" in which the subject of science is sealed off in the armories of a fiction – a truth/knowledge nexus that postures itself as an 'incontrovertible' methodology of knowing.¹¹ In Freud's Australian congress paper, which reads as a somewhat cautious and abbreviated review of some of the fundamental tenets of psychoanalysis, his description of a method of research and tactical therapeutics, which he seems want to defend at the level of practice-based evidence, seems undercut by an uneasy relationship to medicine in the context of his strained collaboration with Jung.

Freud and Lacan were both trained in psychiatry, and despite its customary resistance to and rejection of psychoanalysis, both persisted in addressing their psychiatric colleagues over time. Between 1897 and 1899, Freud was repeatedly refused a professorship at the university despite having made significant contributions to neurology and psychiatry.¹² In 1912, shortly after the congress papers were sent to Australia, Jung's withdrawal from Freud ended the latter's connection with the Zürich group at the Burghölzli psychiatric hospital. Jung's contribution to the Australian congress, *On the Doctrine of the Complexes*, outlines the results of an association experiment involving the exposure of patients with Dementia Praecox to sets of "stimulus words".¹³ His cursory references to psychoanalysis and a diminished formulation of repression erase the inscription of the Freudian unconscious – an epistemological stance prefacing the impending break with Freud, who despite his unease, was able to sustain psychoanalysis in its non-relation to medicine, by maintaining a discursive interchange with it. Contrary to this, Jung's association experiment, in prescribing the 'already said', demonstrates the type of epistemological code that forecloses the subject of science.

Freud's *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, which constituted his first and last attempt at reconciling the science of neurology and a theory of the unconscious, formed part of his transference to Fliess, the collapse of which coincided with the end of their written correspondence and the abandonment of the project altogether.¹⁴ In Freud's first major publication, *Studies on Hysteria*, he deferred the ideal of the project and the knowledge of the doctor to a study of the hysteric's discourse – an exemplary form of the divided subject.¹⁵ In 1955, Lacan's response to the *unfinished* business of psychoanalysis initiated by Freud included a critique of the *Enwurf* (project). In it he recognized, beyond the far-fetched reaches of Freud's ambition for that project, the structure of a fiction – a fiction that ultimately fell

short of the cause. Lacan observed that this structure was reiterated as a schema in Freud's subsequent works, demarcating something over-determined and resistant to symbolization.¹⁶

In the Seminar of 1945/55, Lacan introduced his idea of the “conjectural sciences”, as distinguished from the “exact sciences”, and both critiqued and deployed the former to his own ends in the seminars that followed.¹⁷ In the 1970s, his work became increasingly informed by mathematical logic and topology, he produced a method of non-representational writing. Notably, this did not distance Lacan from the effects of speech, which prevailed in the practice of his clinic and his public seminar. In *On Psychoanalysis*, Freud's emphasis upon the practice of psychoanalysis, irrespective of any appeal made to scientific evidence, refers to the fact that psychoanalysis is essentially a method that privileges the saying over the said. It refers to the fact that the saying of psychoanalysis is reliant on the psychoanalyst's analysis reaching a point in which the subject of science crosses a threshold. Freud encountered this threshold in the impasse of his *Entwurf*, and in his de-supposing of Fliess as guarantor of the Other's knowledge. Notably, their relationship ended with words – words that marked the difference between a paranoid knowledge, which Freud bequeathed to Fliess, and the castrated knowledge of the psychoanalyst, which Freud proceeded to establish.¹⁸ The end of the transference to Fliess however, did not extinguish Freud's transference to the bastard science of psychoanalysis. It insisted, leaving the subject of science barred rather than foreclosed, and Freud's desire in the place of cause.

In the present volume of *Écritique*, we present more of the unfinished ‘business’ of psychoanalysis, which, as writing, does not eschew what is inevitably missed by words or theory. Included are papers that address how this might come to pass in the impossible task of translation, at the interface of psychoanalysis and psychiatry, in the ‘science’ of anthropology and in a testimonial act following the end of an analysis. These papers speak to the fact that transmission is a work born of the necessity of a theory, such that, in the words of Ricardo Goldenberg, “[t]he subversion of the subject, if there were to be one, would be an event of discourse, and its real would indeed be clinically verified, but *not without* precise coordinates of theoretical reasoning, without which it could not even be recognized”.¹⁹

If, in 1911 psychoanalysis was unfinished, it was because Freud's transference to psychoanalysis – that irreconcilable surplus of *Spaltung* – insisted, beyond the limits of evidential knowledge, upon a listening. It insisted to the extent that something was transmitted all the way to Australia. This unfinished work, which has spanned a century ‘down-under’, is inscribed upon the surface of a torsion that is not subterranean.

Notes

¹ Member of the *The Freudian School of Melbourne, School of Lacanian Psychoanalysis*.

² Freud, Sigmund. “On Psychoanalysis: Contributed to Section of Neurology and Psychiatry – Australasian Medical Congress, 1911”. *The Australian Medical Gazette*. 18 (1912): 385-387, 385.

³ Jones, Ernest. *The Life and Works of Sigmund Freud*. Vol II. *Years of Maturity (1903-1919)*. New York: Basic Books, 1955, 77.

⁴ Jones, Ernest. *The Life and Works of Sigmund Freud*. Vol II. *Years of Maturity (1903-1919)*. New York: Basic Books, 1955, 77.

⁵ Jones, Ernest. *The Life and Works of Sigmund Freud*. Vol II. *Years of Maturity (1903-1919)*. New York: Basic Books, 1955, 77.

⁶ Lacan, Jacques. “Science and truth”. *Ecrits*. Tr. B. Fink. New York/London: W. W. Norton, 2006: 726-745, 737.

- ⁷ In the established English text of Lacan's 1966 paper, *Science and Truth*, Lacan interprets Freud's statement, "Wo Es war, soll Ich werden" as denoting: "where it was, there must I come to be as a subject". *Ecrits*. Tr. Bruce Fink. New York/London: W. W. Norton, 2006: 726-745, 733f.
- ⁸ Lacan, Jacques. "Science and truth". *Ecrits*. Tr. Bruce Fink. New York/London: W. W. Norton, 2006: 726-745, 734.
- ⁹ Nierenberg, Ona. "The lay and the law: Legislating the 'impossible profession'". *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society*, 12 (2007): 65-75. <https://secure.palgrave-journals.com/pcs/journal/v12/n1/full/2100110a.html>
- ¹⁰ Le Gaufey, Guy. *The Analyst Confronted with State Legitimacy*. http://web.me.com/legaufey/Le_Gaufey/Textes_1973-2009.html
- ¹¹ "If there is fantasy therein, it is the most rigorous sense of the institution of a real that covers (over) the truth". Lacan, Jacques. "Science and truth". *Ecrits*. Tr. Bruce Fink. New York/London: W. W. Norton, 2006: 726-745, 741.
- ¹² Jones, Ernest. *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*. Eds. Lionel Trilling/Steven Marcus. New York: Pelican, 1977, 290f.
- ¹³ Jung, Carl Gustav. "On the Doctrine of the Complexes". Contributed to section of Neurology and Psychiatry, Australasian Medical Congress, 1911. *The Australian Medical Gazette* 13 (1912): 383-385, 384.
- ¹⁴ Freud, Sigmund. "Project for a scientific psychology (1950)." *Standard Edition* 1. Ed. Anna Freud. Tr. James Strachey. London: Vintage, 2001: 283-392.
- ¹⁵ Freud, Sigmund. "Studies on Hysteria (1895)". *Standard Edition* 2. Ed. Anna Freud. Tr. James Strachey. London: Vintage, 2001, 1-253.
- ¹⁶ Lacan, Jacques. "The Freudian schemata of the psychic apparatus". *The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II*. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Tr. Sylvania Tomaselli. New York/London: W. W. Norton, 1988, 91-171.
- ¹⁷ Lacan, Jacques. *Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1945-1955*. Ed. John Forrester. Tr. Sylvania Tomaselli. New York: W. W. Norton, 1988, 296.
- ¹⁸ In a letter to Fliess dated July 27th, 1904 Freud writes: "You are not alone in regretting – I do too – [...] this incident in which you reproach me [...] By now I have gotten over it and have little desire for it any longer; I am not reproaching you and ask you not to reply to this point". Masson, Jeffrey. M. *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud 1887-1904*. Tr. M. Masson Jeffrey. Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995, 467.
- ¹⁹ Goldenberg, Ricardo. "Betraying Lacan or some remarks on the skin of the twat". *Écritique: Letters of the Freudian School of Melbourne, School of Lacanian Psychoanalysis* 9 (2012): 1-10, 5.